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This paper is a follow up on a earlier one (Mendes, 1998) where I proposed a series 
of models for forest owners associations represented as organisation made up of two groups 
of strategically interacting players: the forest owners who are members of the association 
and the board of directors they have elected. The directors decide on the amount of 
services provided by the association which can be public goods (collective representation 
of the members, promotion of their common interests, diffusion of general information 
about forest programmes and best forest management practices, etc.) and private goods 
and services (silvicultural works preventive of forest fires, technical advice, etc.). 
The models were set up as games in strategic form with complete information and no payoff 
uncertainty. 
 Here I pick up the second of, what is called in that previous paper, the "Portuguese" 
models and extend it in the following directions: 
- there is payoff risk for the forest owners due to exogenous hazards (forest fires or 
others); 
- forest owners can buy private services from the owners which contribute to reduce 
the losses resulting from those hazards. 
 The main focus in this paper is to derive the comparative static results about the 
demand of these private services by the forest owners. 
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Forestry, 4.13.00 – Managerial, Social and Environmental Accounting, at the Centre Tecnològic Forstal de 
Catalunya, Solsona (Spain), 7-10, June, 2001. 
1. INTRODUCTION 
 
Mendes (1998) proposed a series of models for forest owners associations 
represented as organisation made up of two groups of strategically interacting players: the 
forest owners who are members of the association and the board of directors they have 
elected. The directors decide on the amount of services provided by the association 
which can be public goods (collective representation of the members, promotion of their 
common interests, diffusion of general information about forest programmes and best 
forest management practices, etc.) and private goods and services (silvicultural works 
preventive of forest fires, technical advice, etc.). 
"Being non profit organisations, there are no monetary rewards for the directors. 
So their motivation is assumed to come from the positive utility (good reputation, 
personal satisfaction) they get from the amount of services provided by the association. 
Directors and forest owners are assumed to have other activities besides 
managing the association and their forest lands. So in allocating their time they have to 
take into account the costs and benefits (monetary and non monetary) they get from these 
different activities. In taking these time allocation decisions members and directors are 
strategically interdependent in the following sense: 
- the benefits of the time devoted to forest management by the owners depend on 
the services they get from the association whose level is decided by the board of 
directors; 
- depending on the regime of membership contributions, the level of services set 
by the directors might also have to take into account the owners’ forest management 
decisions." (Mendes, 1998). 
Given the fact that this strategic interdependence depends on the regime of 
membership contributions and on the type of services provided by the association, three 
different situations were examined in that paper. The first one called the “Portuguese” 
type of association is one where members contribute with fixed fees to the costs of the 
organisation. The second model is a development of this first “Portuguese” model where 
besides producing public goods, the associations also provide private services to the 
members for which they charge a price. The third model called the “Scandinavian” type 
of associations is one where the members contribute with a share of the gross  value of 
their timber sales. 
 The models were set up as games in strategic form with complete information and no 
payoff uncertainty. 
 Here we will pick up the second "Portuguese" model from that paper and extend it in 
the following directions: 
- there is payoff risk for the forest owners due to exogenous hazards (forest fires or 
others); 
- forest owners can buy private services from the owners which contribute to reduce 
the losses resulting from those hazards. 
 The main focus in this paper is to derive the comparative static results about the 






The output of the association consists in a public good produced in a quantity  and a 
quantity 
Q
R of private services. 
Assumption 2 
In the internal organisation of the associations there are two types of players: the 
members and the board of directors they have elected for some fixed term. 
Assumption 3 
The directors are considered as a single player and the fact that they are forest owners is 
ignored. 
Assumption 4 
For the time frame of this model, the number of registered members is fixed.  
Assumption 5 
Directors and members behave non co-operatively. 
Assumption 6 
The directors don’t get any monetary reward from their work for the association. Their 
incentive for this job comes from the fact that their utility W depends positively on the 
amount of services provided by the association to their members. Utility also depends 
positively on the following variables: 
- Y , the amount of consumer goods and services used for their personal consumption; 
- X , leisure. 
Assumption 7 
Each forest owner faces an exogenous risk of loss in his forest production, the probability 
of loss being iπ . In this case he gets a fraction ( )iRα  of his forest production 
 where: ( )iii BQZF ,,
-  is a forest production function with positive first-order partial derivatives and 
negative second-order own-partial derivatives; 
Fi
-  is the amount of forest private services bought by the forest owners from the 
association; 
iR
-  denotes other inputs of forest production supposed to be fixed. Bi
Assumption 8 
Each forest owner behaves as an expected utility maximizer, his elementary utility U  
depending on the following variables: 
i
- Y , the amount of consumer goods and services used for their personal consumption; i
- , leisure. X i
Assumption 9 
The behaviour of each member has to meet two economic constraints: 
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- a personal budget constraint; 
- a time constraint. 
Assumption 10 
Each member’s budget constraint is the following: 
(1)  ( ) ),,( iiiiiii BQZFRVHmpY αω ++≤+ in case an exogenous hazard happens 
or 
),,( iiiiiii BQZFVHrRmpY ++≤++ ω  in the other case 
where  is the annual membership fee assumed to be the same for all the members and m
r  is the price of the private services provided by the association. 
Assumption 11 
The directors set the price r  of the private services and let the demand determine the 
quantity R . 
Assumption 12 
Each members’ time constraint is the following: 
(2)  T X H Zi i= + i+     where: 
-  is leisure; X i
-  is paid labour time; Hi
-  is time devoted to forest management. Zi
Assumption 13 
The utility of the directors depends positively on  andQ R.  
Assumption 14 
 The behaviour of the directors has to meet three economic constraints: 
- their personal budget constraint; 
- the association’s budget constraint; 
- a time constraint. 
Assumption 15 
The directors’ personal budget constraint is the following: 
(3)  pY H V≤ +ω    where: 
- p  is the price of the consumer goods and services; 
- ω  is the income per unit of paid labour time; 
- H  is paid labour time; 
- V  is the non labour income. 
Assumption 16 
The directors’ time constraint is the following: 
(4)  T X H Z= + +    where: 
- T  is the total time available; 
- X  is leisure; 
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- Z  is time devoted to the association. 
 
Assumption 17 
The association’s budget constraint takes the following form: 
(5)  [ ]C Q R r n Z m S Z rR r, ( ) ( ) ( ) ( )≤ + +  
 










> 0, > 0   where: 
- C  is the total production cost of the public good; 
-  is the number of members who actually pay the membership fees; n
- S  represents other sources of funding besides membership fees, namely public grants 
and other financial support obtained by the fund raising effort of the directors. 
 
3. THE DIRECTORS' EQUILIBRIUM STRATEGIES 
 





              s t. . pY H V≤ +ω  
                   T X H Z= + +  
                              )()()()( rrRZSmZnQC ++≤  X Y Z Q, , , ≥ 0  
 
The Kuhn-Tucker conditions for this problem are the following where λ and β  
are the Lagrange multipliers: 




























































































≤ ≥ =( ) , ,0 0 0  








' '  
Since the association provides both public and private goods the marginal cost C '  
depends on the quantity of these private services demanded by the members. So the 
directors’ equilibrium strategies loose the dominant strategies’ feature they would have 
if only public goods were provided to the members. 
Looking now at the private services’ price policy set by the directors we have to 
























































































































⎥ = −1 1
1
 
where ε r  is the price elasticity of the demand for private services. 


































where  is the marginal benefit of service i. What this result shows is that the optimal 
price for the private services is the one for which the marginal rate at which the directors 
are willing to substitute the private for the public goods is equal to the ratio of the 
marginal benefits of these services. 
iB
 
4 THE MEMBERS' EQUILIBRIUM STRATEGIES 
 
Each member faces the following decision problem: 
(16)  
( ) ( ) ( )















































             s t. . 0,,, ≥iiii RZYX
 
The first order conditions for this problem after simplifications are the following: 
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∂ ,,απ  
























 The first two equations uniquely determine the optimal values of the production 
endogenous variables:  and . So as usual in consumer-producer models where 
prices are exogenous to the decision maker, there is separability between the production 
decisions and the consumption and labour supply decisions. Besides separability, there is 
also recursivity in the sense that the production decisions determine the consumption 
and labour supply decisions but not vice-versa. The first two equations above 
characterize the production decisions. The third one characterizes the labour supply and 
the consumption decisions by the usual condition of equality between the marginal rate 
of substitution between leisure ant the consumer goods and the real wage rate. 
iZ iR
 To get the sign of the partial derivatives of the forest owner's demand for private 
services from the association contributing to reduce the loss due to exogenous hazards we 
have to differentiate the system of the two equations (17) e (18) with respect to the 
variables which are exogenous to the forest owner. Here we will focus on the influence 
of the price of the private services supplied by the association and set by the board of 
















































































 we get: 
 
(21) 




















where  is the determinant of the system considered to be negative under the assumption 










From the system above we also get the value for the partial derivative of the labour 
supplied his forest farm by the forest owner with respect to the price of the private 





















 So under the assumption of this model raising the price of the private services 
supplied by the association would lower the demand of those services b the forest owners 
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